Introduction

To grasp the complexities behind the West’s hesitant response to Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine starting in 2014 and culminating in a full-scale invasion in 2022, one must delve into Russia’s intricate history of information warfare tactics and strategies. This understanding is crucial as it sheds light on why some underestimated Russia’s determination to attack and Ukraine’s ability to resist in the first place (Pinchuk, 2024). Indeed, Russia, led by the Kremlin, has a long history of employing disinformation tactics to achieve its geopolitical goals.

At a high level, during World War II and the Cold War, Russia (then the Soviet Union) used propaganda to sow discord among its adversaries and to bolster its own image. In the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin continued to refine its information warfare tactics, leveraging the rise of social media and the internet to spread its messages more effectively. Whether it was for the purpose of self-benefit, or as experimentation to observe how these tactics work when applied in real situations of interest, Russia’s disinformation campaigns today are not merely relics of the Cold War; they are sophisticated and constantly evolving efforts that pose a significant threat to international security.

Within a year of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we realized that the world’s hesitant response could have been expected. In preparation to invade, Russia deliberately employed multiple information campaigns, aiming to justify its actions through various narratives. The Kremlin sought to erode public confidence, mainly by confusing the identity of the true aggressor from the public, and to deflect blame (Buziashvili et al., 2024). This sowing of discord among allies and manipulating public opinion largely eroded trust in democratic processes, emboldened other authoritarian regimes to follow suit and began to create a climate ripe for further conflict (Dickinson, 2024).

As of early April 2024, Russia has prioritized its war effort, ramping up military spending and forging closer ties with countries like China, North Korea, and Iran, potentially creating a new geopolitical bloc (Dickinson, 2024). This increased military spending works in combination with Russia’s ongoing information warfare campaign as a multifaceted assault aimed at weakening international support for Ukraine and eroding Ukrainian morale (Buziashvili et al., 2024), while simultaneously chipping away at the complete erasure of Ukrainian statehood (Chkhaidz, 2024). Their goal is now to exploit the current information overload and enforce doubt by manipulating sources and narratives (Sadek and Carvin, 2024), portraying the Ukrainian army as brutal and Ukraine as a failing and corrupt state (Aleksejeva et al., 2023). In fact, the sheer volume of conflicting information makes it difficult for the public to discern truth from falsehood, leading to confusion and hesitation in support of Ukraine and its people.

Two years later, these tactics are proving to continually be fruitful, as evidenced by the hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian lives lost, millions displaced, and the global economy continuously facing unprecedented challenges. Despite the West’s imposition of sanctions, provision of aid, and widespread applause for Ukraine’s resilience and adeptness in countering the aggressor’s information warfare during the initial phase of the full-scale invasion, Ukrainian forces find themselves once more grappling with shortages of ammunition and depleting air defence systems. Meanwhile, allies are locked in debates over assigning blame and determining the best path forward (Dickinson, 2024). Why is this the case? What changed?

These questions prompt an assessment of the effectiveness of current broad-level tactics to counter disinformation around the world. In fact, current policies against disinformation seem inadequate, struggling to keep up with the comparable sophisticated and highly effective nature of Russia’s strategies (Dickinson, 2024), fracturing international cooperation and security (Buziashvili et al., 2024; Sadek and Carvin, 2024). Current and alternative strategies aimed at ensuring increasing international support for Ukraine are outlined at the end of this paper with suggestions for a hopeful return to a less chaotic global information space.

If efforts towards a solution are omitted, it is evident to those familiar with the history of both Russia and its information warfare efforts, that should it succeed in its imperialist goals, other countries in the region will be met with a similar threat (Rainsford, 2022). The world is now realizing that Putin’s aspirations of reclaiming lands that were once occupied by the Tsarist Empire are legitimate. We are observing a 21st-century Russian Empire.

Strategies and Implementation of Russia’s Information Warfare

Russia’s information warfare tools

Narrative and content

Russia’s information warfare campaign in Ukraine is a complex and constantly evolving operation. Between 2014 and 2021, traditional media narratives often depicted the Ukrainian army and volunteer groups as ruthless, framed Ukraine as a failed state after its alignment with Europe, and characterized Ukrainians as Nazis (Aleksejeva et al., 2023). Over time, in the face of Western sanctions disrupting Russia’s state-controlled media outlets in Europe, the Kremlin has cleverly adapted its tactics, focusing more on a vast user base by capturing their attention through quick and often entertaining yet polarizing subjects (Buziashvili et al., 2024). As researched by Aleksejeva et al., in the seventy days leading up to the invasion (December 16, 2021–February 24, 2022), analysis revealed dominant narratives across over ten thousand state-backed outlets: Russia’s pursuit of peace (2,201 articles), Russia’s moral responsibility towards regional security (2,086 articles), Ukraine’s perceived aggression (1,888 articles), Western instigation of tensions (1,729 articles), and Ukraine’s alleged puppetry to the West (182 articles) (2023). This adaptation of content spread through existing social media algorithms is just one piece of Russia’s multifaceted information warfare arsenal.

State-controlled media

The evolving narratives, like parasites, need hosts to live and spread on. Over the years, Russia has invested heavily in boosting its cross-border broadcast capabilities, proving its grassroots understanding of the power of controlling the flow of information. For example, in occupied Ukrainian regions like Donbas, they have overpowered Ukrainian transmitters and expanded their reach (Kalenský and Osadchuk, 2024), similar to how they further extended their propaganda reach by partnering with media outlets in Africa and BRICS countries (DFRLab, 2024). These extensions are used as leverage to shape the global narrative in their favour. Internally, the Kremlin leverages Roskomnadzor, their media watchdog, to control the narrative by actively monitoring and censoring online content deemed unfavourable to the Kremlin (Buziashvili et al., 2024). They further weaponize neutrality by presenting fabricated narratives alongside real events, creating a sense of equivalency and blurring the lines between truth and fiction (Buziashvili et al., 2024), a strategy that extends beyond the present, with recent changes in Russian school curriculum, including new history textbooks aiming to indoctrinate school-age children and legitimize the invasion in their eyes (Chkhaidz, 2024).

Social media

Social media manipulation is another key tool. Apart from mastering how to leverage algorithms to spread false narratives, the Kremlin was a pioneer in using bot farms to spread fake news during the 2014 Crimean invasion (The Economist, 2024) — arguably a sandbox test ground for the bot farms and their efforts that we see today. Similarly, since then, social media platforms like Facebook have uncovered inauthentic networks designed to amplify specific narratives, likely backed by Russia (Kann, et. al., 2022), demonstrating the complexity of the challenge. Uncovering these and raising alarms landed the likes of Facebook and Twitter in the “banned” bin within Russia, but did not prevent from further quick exploitation of emerging platforms, as evidenced by the recent DFRLab case uncovering a massive pro-Kremlin disinformation campaign targeting Ukrainian officials on TikTok (DFRLab, 2024). Closer to home, Russia has capitalized on platforms like Telegram and VKontakte, which are popular domestically, to disseminate messages of interest (Aleksejeva et al., 2023).

Russia’s information warfare tactics

Countering this multifaceted assault requires a comprehensive approach that addresses not just the content itself, but also the underlying infrastructure and tactics used to spread disinformation. A breakdown of their key strategies presents the following categories:

Discrediting Ukraine

A core tactic is to spread false narratives about Ukraine, aiming to paint them as unreliable or unworthy of international support. Significant endeavours were and continue to be undertaken to challenge the historical legitimacy of Ukraine among Russian and Ukrainian audiences. This includes portraying Ukrainians as “Nazis” and questioning the authenticity of the nation. As the conflict drags on and grows more complex, so does the Kremlin’s assault on Ukrainian history (Chkhaidz, 2024). These tactics also further involve portraying Ukraine as a corrupt and dysfunctional state, rife with internal conflicts. While instances of corruption were documented, Russia portrayed the issue as pervasive throughout the entire Ukrainian leadership, repeatedly asserting that Ukraine profited from selling Western weapons on the global black market (Buziashvili et al., 2024). The strategy aimed to convince both domestic and international audiences that investing resources in Ukraine’s governance would be futile due to its perceived systemic corruption (Buziashvili et al., 2024; DFRLab, 2024).

Eroding Cohesion

Another tactic is to divide public opinion within countries supporting Ukraine, making it harder for governments to maintain united support. The key difference here between the first and this second tactic is that the primary focuses on eroding the trust of Ukraine, while the second focuses on exploiting existing regional grievances and contributing to internal chaos. This then leads to efforts being redirected from supporting allies in need to fixing local and domestic concerns (Buziashvili et al., 2024). Ultimately, the Kremlin’s goal is to weaken collective security measures and undermine faith in institutions like NATO, the EU, the UN and other (Dickinson, 2024). By now, it is clear that Russia’s disinformation campaigns are not without consequences. These measures have a demonstrable impact on public opinion and while it’s difficult to isolate the exact influence of disinformation, there is evidence that Russia’s efforts have achieved “partial results, like delays in the delivery of military equipment” to Ukraine (Buziashvili et al., 2024).

Fearmongering

Finally, most broadly, Russia uses fearmongering tactics to discourage support for Ukraine. They push the narrative that aiding Ukraine will damage the global economy, lead to further conflict, or even erupt in a nuclear war between the world’s biggest powers (Buziashvili et al., 2024). They also target public morale in Ukraine itself, with tactics like creating fake videos depicting Ukrainian surrender, in an attempt to demoralize the population and weaken their resolve (Osadchuk et al., 2023). Similar to operations internally within Russia, a tactic of fear ensures complacency and compliance.

By employing these multifaceted tactics, Russia aims to manipulate public opinion on a global scale, sow discord, weaken international resolve, and ultimately achieve its objectives in Eastern Europe.

Russia’s information warfare targets and impacts

As already established, Russia’s information warfare campaign is a sophisticated effort to manipulate public opinion around the globe, so it should be no surprise that it does not employ a one-size-fits-all approach. Instead, the Kremlin carefully crafts its narratives to resonate with the specific vulnerabilities and concerns of audiences in different regions.

Europe

In Europe, where anxieties about energy security are high, Russia preys on fears of a harsh winter without access to Russian gas. They have been found to spread false narratives about energy shortages caused by sanctions, and to bolster credibility, these plots were spread through specially created fake websites that mimicked legitimate European media outlets (Kann, et. al., 2022). Another example of the consequences and results following these targets is the decline in public support for Ukraine from countries like Poland. While initially welcoming Ukrainian refugees, some Polish citizens have grown weary due to a combination of factors, including supposed economic strain. Russian disinformation campaigns that portray Ukrainian refugees as a burden likely contribute to these tensions (Osadchuk et al., 2023) more recently being tied to the farmer protests and their stated mission for the boycotting of Ukrainian grain.

Middle East and African Regions

Across Africa, Russia takes a two-pronged approach, one where it positions itself as a strategic partner to the nations with constant reminders of their shared Cold War history, resisting colonialism and discrediting the West’s efforts of reconciling their history as a neocolonial power (DFRLab, 2024). Second, leveraging unofficial groups like the Wagner Group to bolster their military presence and frame the war in Ukraine as part of a larger Western assault on developing countries across the continent (DFRLab, 2024). Further in the Middle East and North Africa, Russia also capitalizes on the pre-existing anti-colonial and anti-Western sentiment, using their RT and Sputnik media outlets to spread narratives critical of the West (Buziashvili et al., 2024). A key tactic in these cases is to highlight perceived hypocrisy in how the West reacts to different conflicts, such as the different treatment of the Ukraine war compared to those in the Middle East (DFRLab, 2024). This strategy is difficult to argue as the hypocrisy in the treatment of Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees versus those coming from the Arab world is observed by many, but largely exploited by Russia. The issue remains in the fact that Russia’s leveraging of these observations is to undermine Western support for Ukraine, rather than bring further justice and fairness to the treatment of civilians from various conflict-torn regions of the Middle East and North Africa.

Latin America

Similar to Africa and all the previously mentioned tactics and tools, Russia uses a combination of state media outlets, diplomatic channels, and social media to disseminate pro-Kremlin narratives across Latin America. What mostly differentiates this targeted approach is the leveraging of Russian ambassadors who play a key role, acting as spokespersons and placers of op-eds and statements in local media outlets to push the Kremlin’s agenda (DFRLab, 2024).

North America

They too often portray the U.S. as an imperialist power and frame the war in Ukraine as a fight against Western domination (DFRLab, 2024). Meanwhile, in the West itself, particularly in North America, Russia has targeted right-wing United States audiences with narratives that also resonate closest with these groups, echoing domestic political divisions — allegations of voter fraud, tax money mismanagement, and overall criticism of U.S. involvement in Ukraine (Graphika & The Stanford Internet Observatory, 2022).

By tailoring their disinformation tactics to specific audiences, Russia seeks to exploit existing divisions and anxieties on a global scale. Recognizing these targeted approaches and the underlying messages is crucial in effectively countering information warfare campaigns. Whether these campaigns decisively influence policy decisions is debatable. However, they can create an atmosphere of hesitancy and raise concerns about the cost of supporting Ukraine, delaying or weakening aid packages. The ultimate goal of Russia’s information war is, once again, clear: to sow discord, weaken international resolve, and ultimately decrease Western material support for Ukraine, chipping away at Ukraine’s ability to defend itself.

Existing Measures Against Russia’s Disinformation and Their Shortcomings

Measures targeting traditional media channels

Traditional media channels seem to be easier to regulate, at first. That is until several Western governments imposed sanctions on Russian propaganda outlets like RT and Sputnik following the invasion of Ukraine (Hellyer, 2023), and were quickly met with raised concerns about government censorship. These concerns were then amplified by Russia’s narratives of eroding trust in local Western leadership, alarming North Americans that they were being lied to, potentially driving them further toward other outlets within the pro-Kremlin echo chambers (Buziashvili et al., 2024).

Measures targeting social media channels

Online, it has become obvious that fact-checking efforts aimed at debunking false information struggle to quickly decipher complex situations. When found faced with a large volume of content online, these tools’ efforts nearly become null as they fail to keep pace, especially with content deliberately designed to evade detection. Additionally, social media algorithms often inadvertently amplify sensational or divisive content, which often lacks nuance and context, fueling the spread of disinformation and furthering the rapidness of its spread (Osadchuk et al., 2023). At that point, reaching those already exposed to or receptive to Russian narratives is even harder as social media algorithms and confirmation bias create echo chambers where users are constantly exposed to reinforcing narratives, making them impervious to opposing viewpoints (DFRLab, 2024).

Real-life consequences of Russia’s sophisticated disinformation campaign surrounding Ukraine’s invasion prove that while existing efforts to counter information warfare and manipulation are in place, they struggle to keep pace with the rapid spread, takedowns, and adaptability of disinformation tactics.

Rethinking Disinformation Mitigation Strategies

The information war waged alongside the physical conflict in Ukraine has highlighted the critical role of effective disinformation mitigation strategies. Drawing on Ukraine’s decade-long experience countering Russian disinformation efforts (Kalenský & Osadchuk, 2024), as well as the analysis of tactics and tools outlined in this paper, we can now explore key lessons and strategies for effectively combating harmful information warfare.

1. Swift Response and Compelling Narratives

While debunking lies remains crucial, effective counter-disinformation goes beyond mere fact-checking and swift response before it takes root. The answer lies in crafting effective explanations that resonate with target audiences. Clear, concise messaging that addresses people’s concerns and anxieties is key together with highlighting the real-world consequences of disinformation and humanizing its impact. Tailoring messages to specific demographics and platforms for maximum reach, while utilizing trusted voices and community figures to enhance credibility can build trust. Should all else fail, removing platforms for spreading disinformation can be used as a last resort as well. As seen with Facebook and Instagram restricting Russian media access, or the banning of RT by North American partners, this approach can significantly reduce their reach. In fact, in the previous year, Graphika’s examination of the actions of Russian state media channels on Facebook and Instagram revealed a rise in both the frequency of posts and the level of audience interaction in the weeks just before the invasion. However, the implementation of restrictions by Meta on these entities between February and March 2022 resulted in a significant decrease in both posting frequency and audience engagement. By August 24, 2022, which marked six months since the start of the invasion, there was a 43% decrease in posting frequency and an 80% drop in engagement levels compared to the same date the previous year (Imas, Ferreira, & Chandra, 2024). However, balancing content moderation with upholding free speech principles is a delicate yet necessary act, one that should not be implemented lightly and requires a significant amount of moderation and guidelines for implementation.

2. Collaborative Networked Defense

As pointed out by several information warfare experts coming from Ukraine, having multiple entities scrutinizing the same information is a preferable scenario. It reduces the risk of overlooking critical information while the overlap itself creates a protective barrier: it becomes more challenging for the likes of Russia to disrupt such a decentralized network since there is no single focal point for Russia to target, thereby safeguarding Ukraine’s capacity to counter disinformation and propaganda. Ukraine’s successful explanation and application of this approach to slowing down disinformation’s spread underscores the importance of collaboration between government agencies, NGOs, and even citizens (Kalenský & Osadchuk, 2024). Fostering trust and information sharing between these groups is crucial as establishing clear communication channels and protocols can ensure efficient information flow. This pre-established trust net and communication flow will then also help secure and apply the often-significant number of resources needed for counter-campaigns. At this point, some argue that the West is underutilizing its economic potential while Ukraine dedicates more resources than most Western nations and produces credible results in countering information warfare efforts and attacks (Pinchuk, 2024 and Kalenský & Osadchuk, 2024). This proves that increased investment is needed while international cooperation is vital for sharing expertise and building a unified global response.

3. Effective Communication Leveraging Humor and Repetition

Effective communication requires consistent messaging. Part of this effectiveness are tactics that capture audiences’ attention quickly and memorably — repetition and humour. However, simply repeating the same information can become tiresome so varying the format (e.g., infographics, videos) and delivery channels (e.g., social media, traditional media) helps maintain audience engagement. Humor, as employed by Ukraine, is also a valuable tool (Kalenský & Osadchuk, 2024) as it serves multiple purposes: it attracts larger audiences and has a higher likelihood of going viral. Moreover, it plays a crucial role in boosting morale among those affected by attacks and enhances resilience against both physical and informational aggression. Additionally, humour enables the imposition of costs on disinformation actors by subjecting them to mockery and ridicule, thereby undermining their credibility. However, caution is necessary as both tactics of repetition and humour are also used by the adversary and contributes to cluttering the information space, causing the content to also gain viral traction and potentially diverting attention away from legitimate discussions (Graphika & The Stanford Internet Observatory, 2022).

Conclusion

This paper has argued that Russia’s information warfare campaign is a major reason for the world’s return to a lack of military and humanitarian support for Ukraine. Russia’s sophisticated and multifaceted tactics, which aim to hurt or even break up alliances, manipulate public opinion, and create a climate ripe for further conflict, have successfully exploited the current information overload to make it difficult for the public to discern truth from falsehood. This confusion and hesitation have had direct consequences for Ukraine as evidenced by the dwindling support from North America, mixed messages from European countries, and a complete lack of interest in cooperation from most countries in the Global South.

Further, disinformation undermines not only support for Ukraine but also fractures international cooperation and security, potentially emboldening other authoritarian regimes and creating a breeding ground for further conflict. Therefore, it is critical to further improve an existing and develop alternative strategies to counter disinformation. These strategies must be multifaceted and comprehensive, aimed at swift response coupled with compelling narratives to ensure misinformation is countered before it gains traction. Collaborative networked defense, as demonstrated by Ukraine’s success, stresses the need for cooperation between government agencies, NGOs, and citizens to monitor and share information efficiently. Leveraging humour cautiously can then also broaden message reach while repetition with variation maintains audience engagement.

Additionally, social media platforms have a particular responsibility to play in combating disinformation such as removing platforms found to be spreading disinformation. This requires collaboration with social media platforms to balance content moderation with free speech principles. Similarly, governments around the world must also work together to develop a coordinated response to information warfare through strategies including but not limited to sharing intelligence about Russian disinformation tactics. By applying the principles of a multi-layered approach discussed in Collaborative Network Defense, those seeking solutions are more likely to be successful. This will also push for the immediate prioritization of allocating substantial resources to this endeavour sooner rather than later.

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